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ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs’ cross-petition is only conditional.
Plaintiffs oppose the grant of the government’s own
petition, which seeks review of the court of appeals’
narrow holding that three provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B are vague as applied to plaintiffs’ specific
proposed pure speech. Pet. App. 5a n.1 (specifying the
narrow scope of plaintiffs’ intended speech activities at
issue). In opposing plaintiffs’ cross-petition, the
government stresses that plaintiffs’ contention “that
the statute is vague as applied to their desired conduct
… is the only issue that was reached by the court
below” in ruling on vagueness. U.S. Opp. 16. That is a
good argument for denying the government’s petition,
because the court’s limited as-applied ruling leaves the
statute facially valid, cannot offer plaintiffs or anyone
else protection for any conduct other than the pure
speech specifically identified, and thus threatens none
of the national security interests that the government
invokes.1 But if the Court decides to grant review of
the three provisions the court of appeals invalidated as
applied, the government has offered no sound reason
why it should not also grant review of the crosspetition, which challenges two other closely related and
overlapping provisions of the same statute on the same
grounds.

1

As-applied vagueness challenges are by definition limited to the specific
conduct at issue. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 370 (1983);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470,
490 (2d Cir. 2006) (per Sotomayor, J.). The court of appeals neither read the
injunction (which covers only the plaintiffs) as broader than the conduct
described at Pet. App. 5a n.1 nor upheld it more broadly, leaving open for
future cases any constitutional challenges relating to any other conduct
plaintiffs or others may propose.

2
1. The government first asserts that the
upholding of the criminal proscriptions on “advice …
derived from scientific [or] technical … knowledge” and
on providing “personnel” should not be reviewed
because it involves only “the application of settled law.”
U.S. Opp. 9. The government cites a number of
decisions (id. at 10-11) and suggests that courts have
routinely rejected plaintiffs’ challenges. In fact, none
of those cases even addressed the validity of the
“personnel” or “expert advice” provision as applied to
speech in support of lawful, nonviolent activity.
Rather, every cited case that even involved Section
2339B alleged materially different conduct – either the
donation of money or support intended to further
unlawful violent activities.2
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United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other
grounds, 543 U.S. 1097, reinstated in relevant part, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir.
2005) (donation of money); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of
State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (organization’s challenge to
designation); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002)
(private suit, involving sending funds); United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F.
Supp. 2d 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (defendant accused of being “part of the
leadership council” of a terrorist organization and assisting directly in its
operations); United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Minn.
2008) (defendant sent money and attended al Qaeda training camps; court
explains that a mere allegation of teaching English would not survive an asapplied vagueness challenge); United States v. Shah, 474 F. Supp. 2d 492
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (defendant accused of providing medical assistance to
wounded al Qaeda fighters, helping return them to fight, with intent to
further al Qaeda’s illegal objectives); United States v. Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d
167 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (defendant provided currency and personnel, and was
prosecuted under a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which requires
proof of intent to support illegal terrorist activities); United States v. Assi,
414 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (defendant transported equipment,
including global positioning satellite device, night vision goggles, and
thermal imaging camera intended to support Hizballah militant operations);
United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (defendant,
inter alia, provided money and scouted locations for terrorist attacks).

3
In the government's principal circuit-court case,
United States v. Hammoud, the court pointedly noted
that only money was involved and that a more
demanding constitutional standard would apply if
speech were at issue.3 And in the only case of which
we are aware where the government did include pure
speech within a Section 2339B prosecution, the district
court held the statute’s “personnel” provision vague as
applied (before the 2004 addition of a definition, but
discussing a similar definition proposed by the
government). United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d
348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The government did not even
appeal that decision, but instead re-indicted the
defendants under a separate statute for intentional
support of terrorist activities. Conspicuously, the
government does not even cite Sattar.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of these
provisions as applied to plaintiffs’ pure speech is in no
sense “settled law.” Indeed, no other cited authority
holds that human rights advocacy can be criminally
proscribed by a content-based prohibition on “expert
advice” and an association-based prohibition on
“personnel.”
2. The government argues that plaintiffs’ crosspetition challenges are not sufficiently related to the
government’s own challenge to warrant review
together. U.S. Opp. 11-14. In fact, all of the arguments
that plaintiffs have advanced with respect to the three
provisions at issue in the government’s petition –
vagueness and non-vagueness alike – are equally
applicable to the two provisions at issue on the crosspetition. And the provisions are interrelated and
3

381 F.3d at 328 n.3, 330 n.4.
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overlapping, making review of some without review of
the others necessarily incomplete.
With respect to vagueness, the government
acknowledges that the “specialized knowledge” and
“scientific [or] technical … knowledge” parts of the
“advice” definition are intertwined; indeed, they are all
part of the same clause. U.S. Opp. 13-14. The
government suggests that the Court “can” nonetheless
assume the latter terms’ constitutionality and, on that
basis, assess the vagueness of the former; and it
suggests that the Court could in any event hold the
cross-petition as to the latter to await a decision on the
former. U.S. Opp. 14 & n.3. But neither course is
sensible compared to the alternative of considering the
“advice” definition as a whole, as Congress wrote it –
and as plaintiffs must confront it.
The government admits that the three terms
defining “expert advice” “inform” each others’ meaning,
making consideration of the full “advice” definition a
sounder basis for decision. U.S. Opp. 13. And in the
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 context, where a similar
(but not identical) phrase appears, this Court has
recognized the artificiality of drawing distinctions
among the three categories, as the government itself
recognizes. U.S. Opp. 15, discussing Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
The vagueness of the “personnel” provision is
also interrelated with the vagueness of the provisions
at issue in the government’s petition. As a practical
matter, for plaintiffs to engage in much of the speech
they propose, they may have to coordinate and consult
with the designated organizations. The “personnel”

5
provision provides plaintiffs and other ordinary
citizens no guidance as to what kinds of coordination
and consultation might be charged as criminal. And
the terms’ vagueness is exacerbated by their
interconnections. Thus, while the “personnel” provision
says that “entirely independent” activity will not be
prosecuted, the government has contended that any
activity done “for the benefit of” a designated group is a
proscribed “service.” The combination of these
provisions renders it impossible to determine whether
advocacy that benefits the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
will be seen as a proscribed “service” or permitted
“entirely independent” activity. In short, the fact that
plaintiffs must navigate all five overlapping and
potentially contradictory definitions heightens the
vagueness of each. This Court should therefore
consider all five provisions if it decides to review the
three provisions at issue in the government’s petition.
Plaintiffs’ non-vagueness challenges to the
“scientific and technical knowledge” and “personnel”
provisions are also interrelated with the issues in the
government’s petition, No. 08-1498. Plaintiffs’ nonvagueness challenges are already present in that case,
as alternative defenses of the judgment. Beyond that,
the government itself recognized the interrelationship
of the non-vagueness and vagueness issues when it
affirmatively addressed First Amendment issues other
than vagueness in its petition. Pet. 19-23. Moreover,
as the court of appeals properly recognized, the
stringency of vagueness review itself clearly depends
on whether First Amendment interests are implicated.
See Plaintiffs’ Opp. in No. 08-1498, at 22-23; Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455
U.S. 489, 499 (1982); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d at 485.
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Plaintiffs’ non-vagueness challenges to the two
provisions upheld and the three provisions invalidated
are closely interrelated. Thus, “advice” “derived from
… other specialized knowledge” and “advice” “derived
from scientific [or] technical … knowledge” both
discriminate based on content; whether any particular
advice is forbidden turns on an assessment of its
content. Similarly, the “personnel” prohibition and the
prohibitions on “training,” “services,” and “expert
advice” derived from “specialized knowledge” all
discriminate based on protected association and on the
identity of the intended audience. Each provision
prohibits speech only when it is communicated to or
expressed in association with a proscribed group.
In short, for vagueness and non-vagueness
grounds alike, the petition and cross-petition are
interlinked and should be considered together if at all.
3. The government’s merits defenses of the two
rulings challenged in the cross-petition (U.S. Opp. 1419) only highlight the errors in those rulings.
The government tacitly confesses the inadequacy
of the court of appeals’ vagueness reasoning with
respect to “advice … derived from scientific [or]
technical … knowledge.” The government does not
mention, much less attempt to defend, the court’s mere
reliance, without analysis, on the fact that “scientific”
and “technical” appear on elementary-school
vocabulary lists. U.S. Opp. 15-17.
The government asserts that the “expert advice”
definition is not vague because that definition appears
in Fed. R. Evid. 702 (the very same argument it makes
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in its petition). U.S. Opp. 15-16. That is doubly
incorrect.
First, in vagueness law, a criminal
prohibition on speech addressed to ordinary citizens is
judged under an especially demanding standard, one
not remotely applicable to the Rules of Evidence,
addressed to lawyers and judges and without
sanctions. The government’s blindness to context
would mean that a law criminalizing the publication of
news reflecting “scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge” would survive a vagueness
challenge simply because it mirrored Rule 702. That is
contrary to the settled law that criminal proscriptions
of speech trigger sterner vagueness standards. See
page 5, supra.
Second, Rule 702 is limited to scientific,
technical, and specialized knowledge itself; it does not
call for a determination of what information is “derived
from” such knowledge – a far more open-ended and
indeterminate inquiry. The government insists that
the “derived from” standard must proscribe something
less than “all knowledge,” Opp. 16, but offers no
explanation of how to determine which knowledge the
“derived from” standard encompasses.
With respect to the “personnel” prohibition, the
government concedes that it cannot answer any of the
questions plaintiffs raised about where one draws the
line between “direction or control” and “entirely
independently.”
Thus, it cannot say whether
consulting with a designated group regarding an op-ed
and accepting a suggested edit would violate the law or
not. It contends that these are merely factual questions
to be resolved at trial, U.S. Opp. 14-15, but that
response confirms, rather than answers, the vagueness
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problem. Either accepting the edit violates the
standard or it does not – and the government cannot
say. If the standards themselves cannot be specified,
no amount of factual development will resolve the
issue.
The government notes that not all uncertainties
about the scope of these provisions affect the particular
speech plaintiffs propose. U.S. Opp. 16. But ample
uncertainties do. Plaintiffs must guess at whether
speech on human rights, the negotiation of peace
treaties, or requests for humanitarian assistance in
any way derive from “scientific” or “technical”
knowledge including matters of complicated economics,
political science, and natural resource allocations. And
the provision of virtually any assistance will require
some coordination with the designated groups, risking
prosecution under the “personnel” standard if plaintiffs
guess wrong as to how much coordination is permitted.
The government’s responses to plaintiffs’ nonvagueness challenges fare no better. It asserts that the
provisions are not content-based, U.S. Opp. 17, but
cannot explain how one could even begin to assess
whether speech is derived from “scientific” or
“technical” knowledge without examining its content.
Content that is not derived from such knowledge is
permitted, while content so derived is proscribed. This
is the very definition of content-based discrimination.
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S.
364, 383 (1984).
The government asserts that the statute is “not
aimed at speech.” U.S. Opp. 17. That claim fails on its
face where, as here, a statute expressly targets

9
“advice” and “training” for criminal proscription. The
express listing of speech as a criminal activity is not
altered by the fact that other activity is also
criminalized, or by the assertion of a speech-neutral
purpose (which may enter into assessment of potential
justifications, but does not eliminate the need for strict
First Amendment scrutiny where speech is targeted).
See Simon and Schuster v. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 US 105, 117 (1991) (rejecting argument that
neutral purpose saves statute targeting speech from
First Amendment invalidation); Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (quoted in Plaintiffs’
Opp. in No. 08-1498 at 25-26). And given the statute’s
plain terms, it is manifestly false to suggest the statute
directly proscribes only “conduct,” as distinct from
speech. U.S. Opp. 17.
The government asserts that individuals are free
to “express their solidarity with any designated group”
or “express virulent messages of support for the group’s
terrorist activity,” and claims that this “ability to
speak removes any possibility that the government is
targeting speech or viewpoint, instead of action.” U.S.
Opp. 17-18. But it is not even clear that the law
permits such speech – if it is deemed to be “for the
benefit of” a designated group, it will constitute a
proscribed “service,” according to the government’s
definition of that term, and if it is coordinated, it may
constitute proscribed “personnel.” Plaintiffs’ Opp. in
No. 08-1498 at 20-22, 29-30. In any event, the two
kinds of speech identified as permissible by the
government are not remotely the only kinds of speech
the Constitution protects. That a statute permits some
forms of speech does not save it from First Amendment
scrutiny where it criminally prohibits other forms,
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such as speech to members of the organizations,
especially where, as here, it does so on the basis of
content.
In addition, the prohibitions plaintiffs challenge
criminalize speech based on its target audience. The
very same speech (expert advice, or training for the
benefit of a designated group) is permitted when
offered to one audience, such as the (nondesignated)
Palestine Liberation Organization, but proscribed
when communicated to another, say the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party. The First Amendment generally bars
the government from dictating a speaker’s chosen
audience. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California, 468 U.S. at 384 (ban on editorializing
denies “the right to address their chosen audience on
matters of public importance”) (emphasis added);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 335 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (a law
“that would allow a speaker to say anything he
chooses, so long as his intended audience could not
hear him,” would be “unconstitutional under any
known First Amendment theory”).
The government asserts that, if the intermediate
scrutiny standard applies, the provisions of Section
2339B, including those at issue here, pass muster
under the standard. U.S. Opp. 18. In doing so, it
retreats to the generality that the statute is aimed “at
stopping aid to terrorists.” Id. But it never says what
interest Congress had, or even asserted, when the
particular aid takes the form of pure speech, like
plaintiffs’ proposed speech, that, among other things,
positively promotes reduction of terrorist activities.
Nor does it explain how such a restriction of pure
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speech is either “unrelated to the suppression of free
expression” or “no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
The government argues that the statute avoids
imposing guilt by association because it forbids aid
only to organizations designated as engaging in
terrorist activity, and requires that the individual act
with knowledge that the organization has been so
designated. U.S. Opp. 18-19. But the same was true of
the many anti-Communist laws this Court invalidated,
or construed to require proof of specific intent to
further unlawful activities. Cross-Petition at 11 n.10.
The government does not explain how, as a practical
matter, one can square the right to associate with a
designated group and the “personnel” clause’s
prohibition on acting in any way under its “direction or
control” or the “expert advice” prohibition on all speech
to the group that derives from “technical” or “scientific”
knowledge.
The government closes its opposition with the
assertion that “there can be no serious argument that
providing direct support to known or designated
terrorists” cannot be “’otherwise innocent conduct.’”
U.S. Opp. 19 (emphasis added). But that assertion,
stopping at the statutory term “support,” ignores the
actual reach of the defined coverage of that term,
which includes pure speech aimed at encouraging only
nonviolent, peaceful activities, and discouraging resort
to violence. The government offers no reason why that
conduct is anything but “otherwise innocent.” It is only
such pure speech that is at issue here.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the cross-petition
for a writ of certiorari should be granted if the Court
grants the petition in No. 08-1498.
Dated: September 8, 2009
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